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REVIEW ESSAYS/NOTES CRITIQUES
Reconsiderations of  
Reconciliation and Recognition
INDIGENOUS AND NON-INDIGENOUS SCHOLARS HAVE LONG 
RECOGNIZED the steadfast existence of structural and ideological barriers 
undermining the recognition of Indigenous rights – especially pre-existing 
rights to land and governance. Indigenous legal scholars, for instance, have 
regularly drawn attention to the intricate connection between Canadian law 
and colonialism, particularly the manner in which violence continues to be 
deployed through the Canadian legal system in relation to Indigenous women 
and alternate relationships to land.1 More recently, in this current era of rights 
“recognition” and “reconciliation” with Indigenous populations, scholars in 
such disparate fields as anthropology and political theory have offered incisive 
accounts of how liberal discourses of recognition and reconciliation have 
served to undercut Indigenous claims and sustain structures of domination 
by reconfiguring and reproducing settler-colonial assemblages of power – 
ultimately drawing Indigenous peoples further into the ambit of the state.2 
Given the presumed efficacy and prominence of discourses of reconciliation in 
Canada today, such concerns continue to resonate.
Indeed, the four texts reviewed in this essay not only continue to “unsettle” 
prominent national mythologies and conventional legal conceptions but 
also trace strategies of resistance and possibilities for establishing decolonial 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples: Arthur 
1 See, for instance, the work of Mary Ellen Turpel, “Home/land,” Canadian Journal of Family 
Law 10 (1991): 17-40; see also Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk 
Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995), 174-9. 
2 Elizabeth Povinelli has referred to this process as the “cunning of recognition”; see 
Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian 
Multiculturalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). In a similar vein, Yellowknife 
Dene political theorist Glen Coulthard has argued that there is a pressing need for 
Indigenous peoples to “turn away” from the limited forms of recognition and delegations 
of rights offered by the Canadian state and instead shift attention towards rebuilding 
communities “from within” through a resurgence and reawakening of Indigenous cultural 
practices and forms of direct action; see Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the 
Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 45.
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Manuel’s Unsettling Canada: A National Wake-Up Call, Manuel’s The 
Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land and Rebuilding the Economy, 
John Borrows’s Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, and John Borrows 
and Michael Coyle’s The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation 
of Historical Treaties.3 While these texts are similarly critical of Canadian 
institutional structures and the discourses of reconciliation prevalent in both 
the legal and political realms, they are not necessarily so quick to discount 
the significance of constitutional recognition for Indigenous peoples. In this 
regard, by canvasing strategies of resistance, critiquing predominant legal 
falsehoods and mythologies, and highlighting constitutional mechanisms 
for renewing relationships grounded within Indigenous legal traditions, 
these works not only offer significant insights for activists, academics, and 
policy practitioners, but also for general readers and students who may wish 
to enrich their understanding of the history of colonial relations shaping the 
development of the Canadian state.
Unsettling Canada: A National Wake-Up Call, written by the late Arthur 
Manuel, is a powerful condemnation of governmental policy and legal 
doctrines (such as the doctrine of discovery) that have regularly been utilized 
to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their lands. Manuel, who for years was 
a leading figure and activist within Indigenous movements at both the 
international and domestic levels, situates his own early protest activities within 
a broader history of Indigenous resistance to Canadian settler colonialism. In 
this regard, the book stands as a potent reminder that Indigenous peoples have 
never been “idle” but have continually resisted the dispossession of their lands 
and rights to governance.
While Manuel’s book brief ly charts some early forms of Indigenous 
resistance and petitions to government by members of Manuel’s nation (the 
3 Arthur Manuel and Grand Chief Ronald M. Derrickson, Unsettling Canada: A National 
Wake-Up Call (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2015); Arthur Manuel and Grand Chief 
Ronald Derrickson, The Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land and Rebuilding 
the Economy (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2017); John Borrows, Freedom and 
Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016); John Borrows 
and Michael Coyle, eds., The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of 
Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). Grand Chief Ronald 
M. Derrickson wrote the “Afterword” for Unsettling Canada and the “Introduction” 
and “Afterword” for the Reconciliation Manifesto. Derrickson not only notes in his 
“Introduction” to the latter book that “it is laid out as he [Arthur Manuel] wrote it” (28), 
but also, in his “Afterword” to the former book, attributes the previous chapters as 
having been written by Manuel (231, 234) – going so far as to refer to it as “his [Manuel’s] 
book” (230). As such, this review is primarily concerned with the main portion of each 
text (written by Manuel).
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Secwepemc Nation) that condemn the territorial encroachments of settlers in 
the early 20th century, the bulk of the book concerns a variety of instances of 
resistance stretching from the late 1960s to the present. This book, to a large 
extent, is a chronicle of how, in the face of successful resistance against Pierre 
Trudeau’s White Paper, the overarching goals of assimilation and elimination of 
Indigenous rights have instead stubbornly persisted and continued to manifest 
within governmental policy. It is ultimately, however, the “mass mobilization 
of the people . . . outside the narrow bounds of parliamentary procedure and 
official negotiating tables” that will lead to increased governmental recognition 
of Indigenous rights.4 The grassroots mobilization of Indigenous peoples 
against Pierre Trudeau’s efforts at constitutional patriation in the 1980s is used 
to demonstrate this point.
Drawing upon the history of the “Constitution Express,” whereby more 
than 1,000 Indigenous grassroots activists and supporters chartered trains 
from Vancouver to Ottawa to increase support for protecting and entrenching 
Indigenous rights (as well as mobilization efforts throughout Europe), Manuel 
argues that it was largely due to the grassroots mobilization of people that 
Aboriginal rights were “recognized and affirmed” in Section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. In particular, he argues that it was through such 
grassroots organizing and resulting constitutional recognition that patriation 
“turned . . . from a serious threat to an important gain for us that we can 
continue to build on into the future.”5 In this respect, the book stands contrary 
to established critiques concerning “recognition” within academic literature; 
while theorists have often drawn attention to problems inherent with official 
forms of recognition, this book reminds readers that legal recognition can 
serve as a potential springboard for the enhancement and protection of rights. 
It also argues, however, that the “great error” after successfully entrenching 
Aboriginal rights in the constitution “was to relax the grassroots mobilization 
within Canada and internationally.”6
4 Manuel and Derrickson, Unsettling Canada, 74-5.
5 Manuel and Derrickson, Unsettling Canada, 75. Similarly, Kiera Ladner has also noted that 
“those who waged [the] battle for constitutional recognition achieved something many 
believed impossible. With the entrenchment of Section 35, Aboriginal and treaty rights 
were recognized and affirmed, arguably as sui generis rights originating within Indigenous 
nations or the agreements between Indigenous nations and the settler society”; see 
Kiera Ladner, “An Indigenous Constitutional Paradox: Both Monumental Achievement 
and Monumental Defeat” in Patriation and Its Consequences: Constitution Making In 
Canada, ed. Lois Harder and Steve Patten (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 270-1.
6 Manuel and Derrickson, Unsettling Canada, 105, 78.
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Manuel builds upon this linkage between grassroots mobilization and 
recognition in The Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land and 
Rebuilding the Economy. In this book, however, the author not only offers a 
succinct plan towards decolonization, but also further unpacks the settler-
colonial logics surrounding Indigenous rights and reconciliation. In order for 
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada to 
occur, “reconciliation has to pass first through truth”7 – and it is elucidating 
the “truth” surrounding the history of setter-colonial relations in Canada that 
is one of the primary aims of this book.
Challenging the narratives of pioneering exploration, lawfulness, and 
compassionate stewardship that reside at the core of the Canadian national 
identity, Manuel tracks the eliminatory logics and legalized violence not only 
contained in Canada’s 1867 constitution but that also continues to structure 
relations between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous Canadians. As 
Manuel rightly points out, the Constitution Act, 1867 fundamentally excluded 
Indigenous legal orders, jurisdictions, and treaty relationships by situating 
Indigenous peoples and their reserved “lands” under the authority of the 
federal Parliament. In Manuel’s estimation, it is theories of “racial superiority”8 
that underpin such legal structures of domination – structures that continue 
to fuel the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian 
state. Connecting the settlement of Canada with more current developmental 
projects in the mining and pipeline industries, the book cautions readers not 
to be swayed by the florid rhetoric surrounding reconciliation and instead to 
consider the extent to which governmental policy acknowledges the ability of 
Indigenous peoples to actually determine how their lands will be developed.
Manuel ultimately argues that what is required to mend the “broken” 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous Canadians 
is “recognition and restitution” in accordance with both domestic and 
international law. In this regard, he argues that it is Indigenous rights to self-
determination as expressed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, proprietary land interests, and “Aboriginal and treaty 
rights on the ground”9 that need to be recognized and respected. Writing in 
an accessible, conversational tone throughout the “manifesto,” Manuel posits 
that there is a need to move beyond strict legal recognition through the courts 
7 Manuel and Derrickson, Reconciliation Manifesto, 56.
8 Manuel and Derrickson, Reconciliation Manifesto, 76.
9 Manuel and Derrickson, Reconciliation Manifesto, 57, 201. 
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and towards a form of political recognition where the ability of Indigenous 
peoples to determine the direction and development of their lands according to 
their own laws and values will be recognized and respected. For Manuel, such 
change can only occur through the continuing tensions and pressures exerted 
by and through grassroots mobilization and non-violent forms of resistance.
In Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, Anishinaabe legal scholar 
John Borrows also provides a discussion of the importance of recognition and 
forms of resistance through a range of case studies of Indigenous direct action 
across Canada. However, Borrows highlights moments where direct action 
(as opposed to its relaxation) can contribute to further oppression and work 
against the interests of Indigenous peoples. Although civil disobedience can 
enhance Indigenous freedom and lead to improved relations, Borrows notes 
that it can also be a “double-edged sword for Indigenous peoples” and be 
used against them by non-Indigenous peoples. Borrows notes, for instance, 
that despite legal principles contained in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to 
protect Indigenous peoples and lands against the encroachment and actions 
of settlers, non-Indigenous peoples “physically occupied Anishinaabe lands in 
the area [of the Saugeen/Bruce Peninsula], contrary to British and Indigenous 
law.” Similarly, Borrows remarks that in the aftermath of the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s 1999 Marshall decision recognizing Mi’kmaw treaty rights to 
fish for a moderate livelihood, non-Indigenous peoples engaged in forms 
of “direct action to attempt to blockade Mi’kmaq access to the [lobster] 
resource.” As such, Borrows cautions readers against romanticizing the 
benefits or uncritically accepting the utility of direct action as it can also be 
“a powerful tool when non-Native people want to resist outcomes contrary 
to their perceived interests.”10 Borrows similarly provides a nuanced and 
contextual analysis of legal traditions in Canada, centring his work within 
Anishinaabe conceptions of freedom and pathways towards living a good life. 
The text not only uncovers problematic assumptions and forms of reasoning 
embedded within Canadian constitutional law and governmental policies that 
frustrate the ability of Indigenous peoples to live according to their own legal 
traditions, but it also provides an opening for considering how Canada’s legal 
10 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 80, 67, 79-80. In a similar vein, early 
work by political scientists such as Radha Jhappan noted that publicity-seeking strategies 
could also be a “double-edged sword” and used as a “weapon” against Indigenous 
peoples by governments; see C. Radha Jhappan, “Indian Symbolic Politics: The Double-
Edged Sword of Publicity,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 22, no. 3 (1990): 22.
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and political domains can be transformed so that Canada itself can be placed 
along a pathway towards decolonization.
For instance, Borrows begins his book by presenting two concepts 
drawn from Anishinaabemowin: mino-bimaadiziwin (living a good life) 
and dibenindizowin (freedom). Within the constitutional traditions of the 
Anishinaabe, according to Borrows, freedom is understood to be both personal 
and relational such that “a person possesses liberty within themselves and their 
relationships.” From this perspective, freedom is understood to be much more 
than just the mere absence of restraint or coercion: “It is the ability to work in 
cooperation with others to choose, create, resist, reject, and change laws and 
policies that affect your life.”11 With these concepts and overarching framework 
in place, Borrows explores the extent to which Canadian laws, policies, and 
traditions facilitate the exercise of freedom.
Given this relational and action-oriented understanding of freedom, 
Borrows considers practices of mobility in relation to the law as one avenue for 
thinking about and pursuing freedom. He does not, however, simply consider 
mobility in the bodily sense of being able to travel freely across a territory, 
but rather also in the philosophical sense of being able to travel “through the 
world of ideas.” According to Borrows, legal regimes can do more than simply 
demarcate and confine the movements of people in physical space – they can 
also confine the rights available for “recognition or retention” through the 
ideas that underpin and breathe life into those systems. In this regard, Borrows 
argues that the Canadian legal system is shot through with stereotypical and 
contradictory ideas concerning the “nomadic” nature of Indigenous peoples (in 
relation to land) or their “static” character (in relation to unchanging cultural 
practices) that serve to limit the rights available to Indigenous peoples and their 
“ability to develop through time.”12
In fact, Borrows delves deeper into both the Canadian constitutional 
structure itself and considerations of legislative recognition from a comparative 
perspective. Borrows, for instance, notes that while Canada’s constitutional 
structure has been one of the ways in which colonial relations of oppression 
and domination have been deployed and sustained, there are also unwritten 
traditions and principles (such as the doctrine of continuity) inherited from 
British imperial law that should help recognize the continuing strength and 
existence of Indigenous laws and jurisdictions. Borrows interestingly notes 
11 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 6, 12. 
12 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 22, 30, 32-3. 
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that, in terms of constitutional interpretation, courts in Canada regularly apply 
“living tree jurisprudence” to non-Indigenous Canadians and deploy forms of 
“originalist” reasoning when interpreting Aboriginal and treaty rights. Such an 
approach freezes Indigenous peoples and rights in time and does not permit 
Indigenous rights to evolve or meet the contemporary needs of communities in 
the same manner as those of non-Indigenous Canadians. While this is generally 
correct in terms of how the Supreme Court has interpreted Aboriginal rights 
under Section 35, it should be noted that this court often departs from its stated 
commitment to “living tree jurisprudence” and interprets texts in a manner 
similar to the “originalist” approach criticized by Borrows. Not only has the 
court relied on originalist forms of reasoning when departing from Charter 
precedents surrounding guarantees of freedom of association,13 but it has also 
deployed “originalist arguments” in both federalism cases and Charter rights 
cases when “giv[ing] weight to the framers’ intentions.” As legal scholars such 
as Leonid Sirota and Benjamin Oliphant have further argued, “Partly or even 
wholly originalist decisions are part and parcel of our constitutional law, and 
they are too numerous to be regarded as aberrations or wished away.”14
It should also be noted that in comparison to the two works by Arthur 
Manuel discussed above, Borrows’s final chapter addresses the issue of violence 
against women in the context of Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, in a 
more substantive manner. Borrows argues that the manner in which the courts 
have framed Section 35 “spawned a political approach that largely emphasizes 
land and resource conflicts”15 at the expense of issues related to gender-based 
violence. In Borrows’s estimation, drawing upon Indigenous legal traditions 
and recognizing that Indigenous governments possess jurisdiction in this area 
could potentially help to alleviate the issue of violence against women.
Borrows’s text is rigorous, challenging, and insightful, weaving together 
the work of theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and James 
Tully with such Indigenous theorists and scholars as Basil Johnston and Glen 
Coulthard. Borrows, in this sense, also travels through the “world of ideas,” just 
as easily drawing upon and critiquing the work of theorists in a multiplicity 
of fields as he does the reasoning of members of the judiciary across time 
13 Bradley W. Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors: The ‘Living Tree’ and Originalist Constitutional 
Interpretation in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence XXII, no. 2 (July 
2009): 346-7.
14 See Leonid Sirota and Benjamin Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian 
Constitutional Jurisprudence,” UBC Law Review 50, no. 2 (June 2017): 511, 548, 510.
15 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 182.
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and geographic space. Borrows’s centering of Anishinaabe legal traditions 
and willingness to question conventional habits of thought in legal, political, 
and social realms not only provides readers with a map to question their own 
underlying presuppositions and/or disciplinary perspectives, but also an 
opening to reimagine and decolonize the legal and political structures of the 
Canadian state.
Borrows’s willingness to question conventional habits of thought and 
forms of reasoning is not surprising given that much of his past work has been 
devoted to uncovering Canada’s “hidden” constitutional origins and treaty 
arrangements.16 This focus on reconsidering conventional understandings of 
Canada’s historical origins is also given new life in his and Michael Coyle’s 
edited collection The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of 
Historical Treaties. The book uses the Treaty of Niagara of 1764 as its entry point 
for considering relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples 
in Canada. In this regard, rather than begin with the 1867 constitutional origin 
story likely most familiar to non-Indigenous Canadians, this book takes the 
gathering at Niagara between Indigenous nations and representatives of the 
British Crown as its narrative beginning. This is significant as the agreement 
reached at Niagara not only recognized the autonomy of both settler and 
Indigenous nations, but also provided a framework for co-existence predicated 
upon principles of kinship, consent, and legal pluralism.17
The collection brings together a number of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
legal scholars to consider how the Treaty of Niagara and its underlying 
principles might inform treaty relations today between Indigenous peoples 
and the Canadian nation. Many of these pieces, similar to the reconciliation 
critiques in the other texts noted and discussed above, provide pointed critiques 
of current approaches and discourses of reconciliation and also provide 
alternative ways of considering reconciliation as grounded within Indigenous 
legal traditions. For instance, given that the Supreme Court’s approach 
to reconciliation under Section 35 has often involved the non-consensual 
reconciling of Indigenous peoples with the sovereignty of the Crown and 
its presumed legal superiority, Borrows argues that the concept is a “f lawed 
16 See for instance, John Borrows, “Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-
Government and the Royal Proclamation,” UBC Law Review 28, no. 1 (1994): 40.
17 Similarly, political scientists such as Peter Russell have referred to the Treaty of Niagara as 
Canada’s “first Confederation”; see Russell, “Can Canada Retrieve the Principles of its First 
Confederation?” in Surviving Canada: Indigenous Peoples Celebrate 150 Years of Betrayal, 
ed. Kiera L. Ladner and Myra J. Tait (Winnipeg: ARP Books, 2017): 77-91.
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metaphor” and should be rejected as “any compromise with colonialism 
causes us to be compromised by colonialism.”18 While Borrows notes that 
Canada’s predominant constitutional narrative has involved the perpetuation 
of racist and discriminatory doctrines in relation to Indigenous peoples, he 
reminds readers, through invoking the Treaty of Niagara, that there are also 
other stories and principles grounded within Indigenous law that continue to 
animate Canada’s constitutional framework. Likewise, the chapter by Aaron 
Mills draws further linkages between the Treaty of Niagara and reconciliation 
– particularly in terms of how its underlying principles could be harnessed to 
produce a more just relationship and understanding of reconciliation. In this 
regard, rather than reconcile Indigenous peoples to an imposed constitutional 
order not of their choosing, the principles for partnership and legal pluralism 
drawn from the Treaty of Niagara “mean that any settler constitutional order 
will have to reconcile itself to the confederal treaty superstructure that holds 
distinct Indigenous constitutionalisms together.”19
The writings in this collection not only draw attention to the linkage 
between discourses of reconciliation and colonialism, but also reverse the 
concept of reconciliation so that it no longer serves a unidirectional or “one-
sided” purpose in support of Crown sovereignty/domination.20 Indeed, authors 
such as Mills draw attention to ways in which it could serve a transformative 
anti-colonial purpose through the clearing of space for Indigenous legal 
orders, jurisdictions, and more respectful treaty relationships. Similarly, 
scholars such as Sarah Morales argue that contemporary treaty negotiations 
and disputes in the province of British Columbia hold a greater likelihood of 
being resolved and placed on a path towards more respectful relations through 
the incorporation of Indigenous legal practices, customs, and traditions. For 
Morales, such incorporation would help to constitute a “renewal of the process 
of reconciliation.”21 Other chapters in this collection draw attention to treaty 
conceptions and understandings of relationships grounded in Anishinaabe 
law (chapters by Mark D. Walters, Mills, and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark), 
highlight legal principles and common understandings contained in historic 
treaty-making processes that could serve as a foundation for renewing treaty 
18 Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” in Borrows and Coyle, Right Relationship, 20.
19 Aaron Mills, “What is a Treaty? On Contract and Mutual Aid,” in Borrows and Coyle, Right 
Relationship, 242.
20 Manuel and Derrickson, Reconciliation Manifesto, 202.
21 Sarah Morales, “(Re)Defining ‘Good Faith’ through Snuw’uyulh,” in Borrows and Coyle, 
Right Relationship, 292. 
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obligations, rights, and persisting partnerships in the present (Michael 
Coyle), and examine international contexts, forums, and legal principles for 
implementing treaties and strengthening relationships (chapters by Jacinta 
Ruru, Jean Leclair, Sara Seck, and Shin Imai). Ultimately, this collection not 
only challenges readers to think critically about Canada’s constitutional history 
in the context of differing understandings of reconciliation but to also consider 
what the underlying principles contained in the Treaty of Niagara might mean 
for future treaty relations and the building of a post-colonial world in Canada.
Reading through these texts in the context of recognition and reconciliation 
– particularly Manuel’s assertion that reconciliation must first pass through 
“truth” – I could not help but be reminded of former Australian Prime 
Minister Paul Keating’s famous “Redfern Speech,” where he spoke about 
turning “reconciliation into reality” in December 1992 to commemorate the 
impending International Year of the World’s Indigenous People. As Keating 
observed:
The starting point might be to recognise that the problem starts with 
us non-Aboriginal Australians. It begins, I think, with that act of 
recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. 
We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. 
. . . We committed the murders. . . . With some noble exceptions, we 
failed to make the most basic human response and enter into their 
hearts and minds. We failed to ask – how would I feel if this were 
done to me?22
The reactions by members of the media and the general public in Canada 
this past June to the use of the term “genocide” in the final report of the 
National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 
suggests that there is still an entire history of (ongoing) colonial relations 
in this country that many Canadians are not yet willing to confront and/or 
reconcile with their own inherited images and self-understandings of Canada. 
These four texts not only shed further light on the continuing linkage between 
Canadian law and settler-colonial violence, but also reveal possibilities for 
establishing a future post-colonial order in Canada based on past practices of 
treaty-making, legal pluralism, and recognition. Indeed, as the work of John 
22 The entire text of Keating’s speech is available online: https://antar.org.au/sites/default/
files/paul_keating_speech_transcript.pdf.
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Borrows has routinely pointed out, Canada’s own constitutional tradition also 
“contains strands of recognition and protection of Indigenous peoples.”23 Given 
that the Treaty of Niagara (and subsequent numbered treaties) are grounded 
in Indigenous legal orders and practices, the recognition of Indigenous law 
or jurisdictions need not be understood as a threat to the Canadian state or 
its constitutional legitimacy. Instead, as the work of legal scholars reminds 
us, Canada also has a history of generating relationships of coexistence 
and mutual autonomy that both emerge out of Indigenous law and which 
continue to underpin Canada’s own constitutional structure. Perhaps it is 
by both acknowledging the ongoing strength of these principles and owning 
up to the entire history of colonial relations that a more honourable form of 
reconciliation can develop in which Indigenous legal orders and jurisdictions 
are fully “recognized” and more just relationships are reinforced.
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